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INTRODUCTION

BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING SOCIAL ORDER OR
DAMAGING AND DEPLETING NEW YORK’S POOR
COMMUNITIES OF COLOR?
Jonathan Oberman† & Kendea Johnson †

On February 8, 2014, with the temperature below freezing, two
New York City Police Department (NYPD) officers performing a
routine “vertical patrol” 1 found Jerome Murdough, a homeless 56-yearold Marine veteran with a diagnosed history of mental illness, sleeping
in a stairwell near the roof of an East Harlem housing project. 2 Instead

† Jonathan Oberman is a Clinical Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law and Director of Cardozo’s Criminal Defense Clinic. After working as a public defender—
appeals and trials—both with the Legal Aid Society and Neighborhood Defender Service of
Harlem, Oberman joined the Cardozo faculty in 1994. In addition to teaching and directing the
Criminal Defense Clinic, he also teaches Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure.
† Kendea Johnson is a Clinical Fellow in the Criminal Defense Clinic. Prior to her
fellowship in the clinic, Ms. Johnson was a staff attorney at the Criminal Defense Division of
the Legal Aid Society in Manhattan.
1 The NYPD website describes a vertical patrol as the “process by which a Police Officer
systematically and methodically checks each building one at a time, covering roof landings,
stairwells and lobbies.” Frequently Asked Questions: Police Administration, N.Y.C. POLICE
DEP’T (NYPD), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/faq/faq_police.shtml (last visited Oct. 22,
2015). The tactic, first applied during the 1960s to address crime in high-rise public apartment
buildings, has been subjected to sustained criticism. See, e.g., Adam Carlis, Note, The Illegality
of Vertical Patrols, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 2002, 2002, 2004 (2009). There is also great
constitutional scrutiny in the federal class action lawsuit, Davis v. City of New York, which was
filed in 2010 and settled in early 2015. See Davis v. City of New York, 902 F. Supp. 2d 405
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motions for summary
judgment regarding individual plaintiffs’ arrests and tenancies). New York City agreed to revise
its police department patrol guide instructions on how to conduct vertical patrols, to limit them
to circumstances more respectful of the rights of residents of the buildings being patrolled and
consistent with constitutional standards. See Benjamin Mueller & J. David Goodman, New York
to Settle Suit on Policing in Public Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/01/09/nyregion/new-york-to-settle-suit-on-policing-in-public-housing.html;
Mark
Hamblett, Judge Signs New York City Stop-and-Frisk Settlement, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 29, 2015), http://
www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202724864015/Judge-Signs-New-York-City-StopandFriskSettlement.
2 For a summary of the story of Jerome Murdough, see Jake Pearson, A New York Jail Let a
Homeless Man ‘Bake to Death’, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 19, 2014, 11:51 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/19/jerome-murdough_n_4993423.html,
and
Caroline
Bankoff, City Settles Lawsuit Over Rikers Inmate Who ‘Baked to Death’ for $2.25 Million, N.Y.
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of taking him to a shelter, 3 the officers arrested him for trespassing,
brought him to their precinct, and determined that he should neither be
released nor issued a Desk Appearance Ticket (DAT). 4 Instead, they put
the case “on line”—holding Mr. Murdough in custody from arrest
through court arraignment—and a few hours after arresting him,
transported him to Manhattan Criminal Court’s Central Booking for
processing. There, the arresting officer met with an assistant district
attorney (ADA) assigned to a regular shift in the Early Case Assessment
Bureau, 5 who evaluated the case and decided to charge Mr. Murdough
with a crime. 6 Based on Mr. Murdough’s past criminal record and
MAG.: DAILY INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 1, 2014, 5:33 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/
2014/11/nyc-settles-rikers-lawsuit-for-225-million.html.
3 New York City’s shelter system is far from benign. With New York City’s rate of
homelessness at its largest since the Great Depression, scores of homeless people choose to
“sleep rough” in the streets, parks, and subways on a nightly basis instead of entering the City’s
shelter system. See Patrick Markee, Municipal Shelter System in New York City Fails to Meet the
Needs of Homeless Individuals, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 17, 2015, 11:08 AM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/municipal-shelter-system-nyc-fails-homeless-individualsarticle-1.2117926; see also Tana Ganeva, “Conditions Were ‘Bluntly Dickensian’”: The Disgrace
of New York’s Homeless Shelters, SALON (July 9, 2015, 6:57 PM), http://www.salon.com/2015/
07/09/homeless_in_nyc_partner; Winnie Hu, Review of New York Shelter System Finds
Hundreds of Violations, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/13/
nyregion/new-york-homeless-shelter-system-violations-report.html; Vivian Yee, Homeless
Families Endure Roaches, Mice and Failed Promises, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/nyregion/new-york-relies-on-housing-program-it-deplores-ashomeless-ranks-swell.html.
4 The NYPD Patrol Guide provides that a DAT may be issued at the discretion of a
precinct desk officer, in lieu of holding a person in detention until court arraignment, “for
misdemeanors, violations, and certain class ‘E’ felonies for hospitalized prisoners.” NYPD,
PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE 208-27: DESK APPEARANCE TICKET—GENERAL PROCEDURE 1
(2013). A DAT is made returnable on a future date set by the desk officer to the arraignment
part of the criminal court in the borough in which the prisoner was arrested. After being issued
the DAT, the prisoner is released from the precinct. Id.
5 The Early Case Assessment Bureau (ECAB) is the office in the New York County District
Attorney’s Office (DANY) in which ADAs meet with arresting officers to: assess whether
probable cause exists to support an arrest, evaluate the arrest for legal sufficiency, determine
whether to advance the case through the system or decline to prosecute, and assess what bail, if
any, to seek in the event that the defendant does not resolve the case at the time of his initial
arraignment. The ECAB has been called “the epicenter of the criminal justice system.” John
Eligon, In a Complaint Room, a Prosecutor’s-Eye View of Crime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/nyregion/23ecab.html. As such, “[a]ssistants must
determine the proper charges to file based on the facts of a case—which are usually provided by
a police officer—or whether to drop charges altogether.” Id. But as was the case in 2010 when
the New York Times article was written, and was equally true at the time of Mr. Murdough’s
arrest, and is no less true now, prosecutors stress that, at least in theory, the “ECAB is a place
for investigation, not simply writing complaints.” Id.
6 Between 2012 and 2014, researchers at the Vera Institute of Justice “worked in close
partnership with DANY . . . collecting and analyzing a wide range of data to examine case
outcomes occurring along a continuum of discretionary points for different racial and ethnic
groups.” BESIKI KUTATELADZE ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH SUMMARY: RACE AND
PROSECUTION IN MANHATTAN 2 (2014), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/
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history, which included six instances of Failures to Appear (FTA), 7 the
ADA evaluating the case recommended that the prosecutor assigned to
the arraignment court ask that bail be set at $3,500 in order to assure
Mr. Murdough’s return to court, 8 and recommend a sixty-day sentence
downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-summary.pdf. The report, issued in July 2014,
concluded that DANY provided next to no screening in misdemeanor cases, with a rate for
declination to prosecute of only four percent. Id. at 4 (“Vera found that DANY prosecutes
nearly all cases brought by the police, including 94 percent of felonies, 96 percent of
misdemeanors, and 89 percent of violations.”). While Vera concluded that no noticeable racial
or ethnic differences attached at this discretionary point, id. at 3, a different conclusion arose
when Vera examined data relating to pretrial detention. Vera found that while several factors—
including “the seriousness of the charges, whether the defendant had an outstanding bench
warrant, whether the defendant had a prison record, the type of offense with which the
defendant was charged, whether the defendant had a private attorney or one who was courtappointed, and the defendant’s gender”—proved to be strong indicators of pretrial detention or
release decisions at arraignment, race and ethnicity were measureable factors. Id. at 5.
Specifically, the data demonstrated that black defendants, like Mr. Murdough, were forty-eight
percent more likely to be detained when compared to similarly situated white defendants. See
BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTION AND
RACIAL JUSTICE IN NEW YORK COUNTY: TECHNICAL REPORT 85 (2014), http://www.vera.org/
sites/default/files/resources/downloads/race-and-prosecution-manhattan-technical.pdf.
7 New York Criminal Procedure Law section 510.30(2) delineates the factors a court must
consider when determining what conditions, if any, to impose on an individual’s release
following initial court arraignment. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 2009).
Subsection 2(a)(vi) directs the court to consider the person’s “previous record if any in
responding to court appearances when required or with respect to flight to avoid criminal
prosecution.” Id. § 510.30(2)(a)(vi) (emphasis added). For a concrete demonstration of the
impact that past failures to appear can have on a defendant’s qualification for nonbail,
supervised release programs, see Mari Curbelo et al., Research Brief No. 32: Queens Supervised
Release, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC. (2013). A warrant history—the failure to
appear for one’s designated court case—may by itself cause one to be disqualified from a
supervised release program, unless the defendant can provide a mitigating narrative that
reduces the presumption of unreliability which otherwise attaches to one’s past failure to return
to court.
8 The damage that cash bail imposes on those too poor to pay it has recently received
increased focus, causing New York City to adopt a modest pilot program that will divert up to
3,000 people who would otherwise have been held on bail into pretrial supervision of some
kind. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, When Bail Is out of Defendant’s Reach, Other Costs Mount, N.Y.
TIMES (June 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/11/us/when-bail-is-out-ofdefendants-reach-other-costs-mount.html; Jamie Fellner, Opinion, Power Failure: NYC Judges
Penalize the Poor, OBSERVER (July 13, 2015, 7:10 AM), http://observer.com/2015/07/powerfailure-nyc-judges-penalize-the-poor; Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html; Margaret Talbot, The
Case Against Cash Bail, NEW YORKER (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/the-case-against-cash-bail. But even as New York City has introduced new programs in an
attempt to ameliorate the disproportionate impact cash bail has on indigent defendants, it will
continue to rely on existing risk-assessment tools that give weighted significance to whether the
person charged has failed to appear for scheduled court appearances in prior cases. For a
discussion of the new programs in place or soon to be part of New York City’s bail experiment,
see Rick Rojas, New York City to Relax Bail Requirements for Low-Level Offenders, N.Y. TIMES
(July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/nyregion/new-york-city-introduces-bailreform-plan-for-low-level-offenders.html, and Alysia Santo, Stung by Abuses at Rikers, New
York City Acts on Bail Reform, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 8, 2015, 6:05 PM), https://
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if Mr. Murdough instead chose to resolve the case by pleading guilty to
the charge. 9
With the arrest charge written into a complaint and docketed, Mr.
Murdough appeared in Manhattan Criminal Court for his arraignment.
During the course of a seemingly pro forma court appearance, Mr.
Murdough rejected the judge’s offer—a thirty-day sentence if he pled
guilty to the trespass charge for which he had been arrested. 10 With the
www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/08/stung-by-abuses-at-rikers-new-york-city-acts-on-bailreform. Thus, supervised release, as an alternative to bail, will not be open to everyone. “[The
New York City Criminal Justice Agency’s] current risk assessment program to determine who
is eligible for the program,” or, release pending trial absent any bail conditions, “consists of a
weighted point system with five questions. The most weighted question is whether the
defendant’s bench warrant count is at zero.” Raven Rakia, How Will de Blasio’s Bail Reform
Actually Work?, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 26, 2015, 3:30 PM), http://gothamist.com/2015/08/26/de_
blasios_bail_reform.php. In this regard, New York City will apply the existing practice of many
states that have implemented bail reform by incorporating risk-assessment tools developed by
the John and Laura Arnold Foundation. This tool relies, among other factors, on “the person’s
age and criminal history, including any prior incarcerations and failures to appear in court.”
Chris Peak, Each Day, 731,000 People Are in Jail. How Many Are There Simply Because They
Can’t Afford to Make Bail?, NATIONSWELL (July 29, 2015), http://nationswell.com/new-yorkcity-reform-bail-no-jail.
9 Cf. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS’ ASS’N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 1–2 (2014), http://www.nycla.org/
siteFiles/Publications/Publications1668_0.pdf (“In New York City, bail is set in approximately
one-third of cases that continue past arraignment, about 50,000 cases per year. At any given
moment, approximately 39% of the City’s jail population are pre-trial detainees who have been
charged with, but not convicted of, a crime, and the average length of stay for pre-trial
detainees is 53 days. Eighty percent of defendants in state criminal cases are determined to be
indigent, and thus provided with mandated representation. Yet the average amount of bail set is
$2000; bail is set at less than $500 in only 17% of cases. While bail set at even $500 may not
appear onerous, a full 44% of defendants are never able to pay the bail amount and therefore
cannot obtain release while their case is pending. In New York City alone in 2011, bail was set
on 25,296 defendants who were charged with crimes that were only misdemeanors or
violations.” (footnotes omitted)). As early as 2013, Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals, Jonathan Lippman, “called for a ‘top to bottom’ overhaul of making bail
determinations that not only protects public safety but is fair to low-income defendants waiting
for their cases to be adjudicated.” Joel Stashenko, Lippman Proposes Bail System Fix, Expansion
of Supervised Release, N.Y.L.J. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=
1202587085501/Lippman-Proposes-Bail-System-Fix-Expansion-of-Supervised-Release. Then,
in early October 2015, impatient with the legislature’s failure to adopt bail reform and
concerned that “[f]ar too many people are trapped in pretrial detention simply because they are
poor,” Chief Judge Lippman “announced a series of administrative changes . . . intended to
reduce the number of people who are incarcerated for long periods before trial because they
cannot make bail.” James C. McKinley Jr., State’s Chief Judge, Citing ‘Injustice,’ Lays Out Plans
to Alter Bail System, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015) (first quoting Chief Judge Lippman), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/10/02/nyregion/jonathan-lippman-bail-incarceration-new-york-statechief-judge.html; see also Press Release, N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., Chief Judge Jonathan
Lippman Announces Series of Reforms to Address Injustices of NY’s Current Bail System (Oct.
1, 2015), https://www.nycourts.gov/press/PDFs/PR15_13.pdf.
10 Transcript of Arraignment at 3, People v. Murdough, No. 2014NY010756 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Feb. 8, 2014) (on file with author). In New York City, there is a presumptive 24-hour period
between arrest and arraignment. The minutes of Mr. Murdough’s arraignment made clear that
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offer rejected, the judge heard the prosecutor’s arguments on the
appropriate bail conditions to secure Mr. Murdough’s return to court to
contest the pending misdemeanor trespass charge. In response to the
prosecutor’s request for $3,500, cash or bond, 11 the public defender
assigned to Mr. Murdough’s case neither argued for lower bail nor
suggested some nonfinancial conditions that, if agreed to by the judge,
would—at least during the pendency of this case—have kept Mr.
Murdough out of jail. 12 In fact, the assigned public defender made no
bail application whatsoever. 13 When asked by the judge whether he
wished to be heard on the question of bail, the defender simply said,
“No, Your Honor.”14
The judge set bail at $2,500, cash or bond, and adjourned the case
for nineteen days to allow defense counsel to file pretrial motions. That
nineteen-day period constituted the full amount of time that Mr.
Murdough would have served had he pled guilty and accepted the
thirty-day sentence offered by the judge. 15 Critically, for the
undomiciled Mr. Murdough, the bail terms imposed by the judge were
the functional equivalent of remand. 16
it took place in “AR4,” the designation assigned to Sunday day arraignments. Id. at 1. Thus, Mr.
Murdough was arrested on the evening of February 7, 2014, and then arraigned the following
day, on February 8, 2014.
11 Cf. People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, 18 N.Y.3d 660, 665–66 (2012) (holding that courts
must set bail in two forms, as opposed to setting cash bail only).
12 While judges routinely and perhaps reflexively set bail almost exclusively in terms of cash
or bond, New York’s bail statute permits judges to consider and set bail in a multitude of
forms—many of which do not require the posting of cash or bond secured by private property.
Judge Lippman recognized as much, underscoring that New York’s bail statute provides for
seven types of bail bonds, as well as cash bail and credit card bail, but that as a matter of
practice, “judges exclusively use two types—cash bail or insurance company bail bonds.” Press
Release, N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., supra note 9. In order “[t]o facilitate wider use of
alternate forms of bail that defendants may be able to post more readily, the court system will
enhance training for judges and clerks on the availability of alternate types of bail and the
procedures required.” Id.; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10.
13 See Transcript of Arraignment, supra note 10.
14 Id. at 4.
15 Misdemeanor sentences are calculated by reference to N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(4),
30(1)(b), 85.00 (McKinney 2009), and N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 804 (McKinney 2014). In New
York, a person serving a definite sentence on a misdemeanor will automatically earn “good
behavior time” credit of one-third of the term of the sentence. See PENAL LAW § 70.30(4)(b); see
also CORRECT. LAW § 804(2). Thus, had Mr. Murdough accepted the arraignment judge’s offer
to plead guilty to the charge with a promise of a thirty-day sentence, he would have earned ten
days of “good behavior time” credit, reducing the time he actually needed to serve to twenty
days. Crediting him for the day he had been in custody between his arrest and arraignment, the
thirty-day sentence offered by the judge would have been satisfied nineteen days after the
arraignment—the day the judge fixed for his next court appearance.
16 See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., A DECADE OF BAIL
RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY: FINAL REPORT (2012), http://static1.squarespace.com/static/
546cc3c3e4b0e3dbf861c974/t/54906416e4b02102b7c91376/1418748950483/CJA++DecadeBailResearch12.pdf. Thus, for example, in the 22,642 nonfelony cases where bail was
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One week later, Mr. Murdough died of excessive heat in his jail cell
at Rikers Island (Rikers). 17 In the words of one city official who spoke on
the condition of anonymity, “[Mr. Murdough] basically baked to
death.” 18 New York City Councilman Rory Lancman described the case
as “almost the perfect storm of the city’s failed policies on homelessness,
mental health, veteran services and corrections.” 19 The case was indeed a
perfect storm of failed policies, institutions, and practices, but Mr.
Lancman’s description was under-inclusive. At its core, Mr.
Murdough’s arrest highlighted the limitations and challenges posed by
the NYPD’s “Broken Windows” policing policy 20 which, as
set in 2013, 15,733 (69.5%) had bail set at $1,000 or less. See N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY,
INC., ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 30 (2014) [hereinafter CJA ANNUAL REPORT 2013].
Approximately 87% of these defendants were unable to pay this modest sum at arraignment,
and more than 46% never made bail at all. Id. According to a 2007 study, those who were
unable to make bail spent a median of five days at Rikers Island. See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., PRETRIAL DETENTION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART 1:
NONFELONY CASES: FINAL REPORT 73 (2007). Forty-four percent of all cases are disposed of at
arraignment—that is, the case is dismissed or adjourned in contemplation of dismissal, where
the defendant receives a sentence without any jail time (not even time served). See CJA
ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra, at 17. Black and Hispanic defendants were more likely to be
detained at arraignment (i.e., remanded without bail, or be unable to make bail) than white
defendants. See KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 6, at 3. Furthermore, black and Hispanic
residents comprised 89% of all pretrial detainees held on bail of $1,000 or less. See HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF LOW INCOME
NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 48 (2010), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf.
17 Sadly, Mr. Murdough was not the only person to die recently while in the custody of the
New York City Department of Corrections. See, e.g., Stephen Rex Brown, Diabetic Inmate
Needing Insulin Dies After Suffering for 14 Hours as Rikers Island Guards Do Nothing, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 26, 2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/exclusiverikers-guards-diabetic-inmate-die-article-1.2337244; Rikers Inmate Found Dead in Cell After
Suspected Overdose, CBS N.Y. (Oct. 14, 2015, 4:33 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2015/10/
14/rikers-inmate-death-richard-gonzalez; Rich Schapiro, Mentally Ill Rikers Island Inmate Dies
After Languishing in Jail Cell for 7 Days, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 22, 2014, 1:11 PM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/rikers-island-inmate-dies-7-days-cell-reportarticle-1.1801606; see also Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S.
Attorney Finds Pattern and Practice of Excessive Force and Violence at NYC Jails on Rikers
Island that Violates the Constitutional Rights of Adolescent Male Inmates (Aug. 4, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/manhattan-us-attorney-finds-pattern-and-practiceexcessive-force-and-violence-nyc-jails.
18 Jake Pearson, APNewsBreak: NYC Inmate ‘Baked to Death’ in Cell, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Mar. 19, 2014, 9:46 PM) (quoting an anonymous city official), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/
apnewsbreak-nyc-inmate-baked-death-cell.
19 Michael Schwirtz, New York Council Sees Flawed Mental Health System, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/nyregion/new-york-council-sees-flawedmental-health-system.html (quoting N.Y.C. Councilman Rory Lancman).
20 The term “Broken Windows” derives from a 1982 Atlantic Monthly article, which
advanced a non-data-based and significantly anecdotally derived hypothesis that correcting
visible signs of social disorder will reduce serious crime. The theory has spawned aggressive
order-maintenance policing strategies in New York City and numerous other jurisdictions and
depends on producing a high volume of nonfelony, “quality-of-life” arrests. See George L.
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implemented, has produced a high volume of nonfelony arrests. In
addition, Mr. Murdough’s death highlighted the degree to which the
New York County District Attorney’s Office and the judiciary failed to
provide appropriate, independent oversight of the NYPD. That
inadequacy was compounded by the assigned public defender’s failure
to vigorously challenge the theory and practice of hyperaggressive
Broken Windows policing as they were applied to Mr. Murdough’s
case. 21
What happened to Mr. Murdough is an appropriate and somber
lens through which to consider the current state of New York City’s
criminal justice system. The case compels a number of interrelated
questions: Why did police officers determine that it was appropriate to
arrest Mr. Murdough? Is low tolerance for minor offenses the most
intelligent or efficacious approach to policing?22 To the extent that
Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/brokenwindows/304465; George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Jr., Do Police Matter? An Analysis of
the Impact of New York City’s Police Reforms, MANHATTAN INST. 8 (2001), http://
www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_22.pdf (“[A] measure of ‘broken windows’ policing [is]
represented by a precinct’s arrests for misdemeanor offenses . . . .”); see also Bernard E.
Harcourt, Broken-Windows Policing Is a High-Arrest Program, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG
(Aug. 17, 2015, 4:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bernard-e-harcourt-/brokenwindows-policing-i_b_8000250.html.
21 Broken Windows policing has had a dramatic impact on the number of people arrested
and charged with nonfelony crimes. Researcher Freda Solomon of the New York City Criminal
Justice Agency has charted nonfelony arrests in New York City from 1989—before Broken
Windows was adopted—to 1998—by which time the policy was well entrenched. She noted that
the number of nonfelony arrests prosecuted increased by nearly 90,000: before Broken
Windows was adopted in 1989, there were 86,822 nonfelony arrests; in 1998, there were
176,432. See FREDA F. SOLOMON, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., RESEARCH BRIEF:
THE IMPACT OF QUALITY-OF-LIFE POLICING 2 (2003). Between 1998 and 2007, for example, the
number of misdemeanor arrests was never less than 189,000, and it rose to as high as 231,120 in
2007. See K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive
Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 283 (2009). The high
volume of nonfelony arrests has continued over the last decade. A 2014 report authored by
Preeti Chauhan and others of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice collected state and local
arrest data since 1980, and presented the clearest picture to date of New York City’s threedecade long shift in crime policy. The report made clear that in 1980, felony arrests outpaced
those for misdemeanors and hit a peak in 1989 with 149,204 felony arrests. See PREETI
CHAUHAN ET AL., JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRENDS IN MISDEMEANOR ARRESTS IN
NEW YORK 9, 17 (2014), http://johnjay.jjay.cuny.edu/files/web_images/10_28_14_TOC
FINAL.pdf. By 2013, the two categories had flipped: the arrest rate for nonfelonies skyrocketed
past that for felonies. Id. at 10. Specifically, in 2013, the police made 225,684 nonfelony arrests,
id. at 18, but only 90,532 felony arrests, id. at 17. The study provided vivid evidence of the
consequences of the Broken Windows policy predicated on preventing major crime by
aggressively pursuing minor offenses.
22 For example, a competing view measures the utility of police conduct, not exclusively by
reference to the volume of low-level offenses, but instead, by a more complicated rubric that
seeks to incorporate the policed community’s sense of its own safety and the concomitant
legitimacy of police conduct. See Susan Shah & Jim Burch, Opinion, How to Build Trust in
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Broken Windows policing purports to be motivated by concern for
enhancing safety and the community’s social contract, is the way in
which it is being implemented by the NYPD producing the desired
beneficial effect on the communities of color that are absorbing the
brunt of its impact?
More specifically, as the Broken Windows theory was applied to
Mr. Murdough, when the ADA assigned to the Early Case Assessment
Bureau interviewed the arresting officer, why did that ADA choose to
continue the case as opposed to diverting it out of the criminal justice
system? Then, having determined that the facts merited a prosecution,
why did the prosecutor, aware of Mr. Murdough’s past arrest history
and mental health condition, deem it appropriate to recommend that he
be held on bail when nothing suggested that he could possibly post cash
or secure a bond by way of property? When the case was arraigned, the
prosecutor recommended a sixty-day jail sentence on a plea to the
charge and then requested $3,500 in bail—were those appropriate
exercises of prosecutorial discretion?
Posed another way, what normative notions of safety and security
directed the New York County District Attorney’s Office to request a
sixty-day jail sentence for the conduct at issue—sleeping in a stairwell—
and $3,500 bail if the plea were rejected? How did those standards,
whatever they may be, comport with the prosecutor’s sense of justice
and represent a sound exercise of prosecutorial discretion, when Mr.
Murdough’s crime, in the most basic sense, was that he was homeless,
needed a place to sleep, and suffered from a diagnosed history of mental
illness? 23
Why, in turn, did the judge offer Mr. Murdough thirty days in jail,
in essence, for being undomiciled? When Mr. Murdough rejected the
plea, why did the judge set bail at what anyone would reasonably
recognize as an unattainable amount, especially when the New York bail
statute unequivocally provides that bail’s primary purpose is to assure
that the person returns to court?24 This last question assumes greater
significance, as any judge presiding in New York City’s arraignment
Policing: Measure What Really Matters, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 23, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/23/how-to-build-trust-in-policing.
23 Rule 3.8 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct unequivocally states that “[a]
prosecutor . . . shall not . . . maintain a criminal charge when the prosecutor . . . knows or it is
obvious that the charge is not supported by probable cause.” RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
3.8(a) (N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. 2013). Similarly, the American Bar Association (ABA)
notes its expectation that “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N
2013).
24 New York’s bail statute unequivocally states that, “[w]ith respect to any principal, the
court must consider the kind and degree of control or restriction that is necessary to secure his
court attendance when required.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a) (McKinney 2009).
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courtrooms would know that cash and bond bail often have the
disparate effect of imprisoning poor people of color. 25
Finally, why did the assigned public defender, at least as reflected
by the record of the proceedings, do nothing to secure a more favorable
outcome for his client? 26 One may wonder whether Mr. Murdough
asked his lawyer to forego a bail application because he preferred to go
to Rikers for the proverbial “three hots and a cot?” And if that were the
case—if a jail cell at Rikers seemed to Mr. Murdough a more attractive
option than a bed in a city-run men’s shelter—what a terrible
indictment that would be of the system that failed him.
These questions, and others, derive from the officer’s initial
decision to arrest Mr. Murdough—a decision that gave effect to a theory
of policing that, as applied in New York City, appears to damage more
lives than it repairs, while leaving unaddressed the underlying root
causes that often contribute to nonfelony criminal behavior. 27
And then there is the case of Eric Garner: on July 17, 2014—less
than six months after Mr. Murdough’s death—on a street in the heavily
policed neighborhood of Tompkinsville, Staten Island, a police officer
killed Mr. Garner by administering a chokehold, while attempting to
arrest him for selling a single cigarette, called a “loosie.” 28 The grand
jury hearing the evidence in that case voted not to indict the officer on

25 For more than two years, Jonathan Lippman, the recently retired Chief Judge of New
York’s highest court, has advocated for bail reform. He urged the passage of legislation that
would establish a presumption of release, for nonviolent, nonfelony charges—such as those on
which Mr. Murdough was arraigned. See JONATHAN LIPPMAN, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT
SYS., THE STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2013: “LET JUSTICE BE DONE” 3–6 (2013), https://
www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/SOJ-2013.pdf; Russ Buettner, Top Judge Says Bail in New York
Isn’t Safe or Fair, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/nyregion/
judge-jonathan-lippman-seeks-to-overhaul-bail-process.html.
26 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
27 See Howell, supra note 21; E.B., What “Broken Windows” Policing Is, ECONOMIST (Jan.
27, 2015, 11:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/01/economistexplains-18; Editorial, Broken Windows, Broken Lives, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/opinion/broken-windows-broken-lives.html;
Michael
Greenberg, ‘Broken Windows’ and the New York Police, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 6, 2014), http://
www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/06/broken-windows-and-new-york-police;
Eugene
Robinson, Opinion, It’s Time to Seriously Rethink ‘Zero Tolerance’ Policing, WASH. POST (May
4, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-broken-pproach/2015/05/04/5119f10cf28c-11e4-b2f3-af5479e6bbdd_story.html.
28 Joseph Goldstein, A Cigarette for 75 Cents, 2 for $1: The Brisk, Shady Sale of ‘Loosies’,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Goldstein, A Cigarette for 75 Cents, 2 for $1], http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/04/05/nyregion/05loosie.html; Joseph Goldstein & Marc Santora,
Staten Island Man Died from Chokehold During Arrest, Autopsy Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/nyregion/staten-island-man-died-from-officerschokehold-autopsy-finds.html. “Loosie” is the street term given to single cigarettes, sold most
often for seventy-five cents or two for one dollar. See Goldstein, A Cigarette for 75 Cents, 2 for
$1, supra.
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any charge. 29 Too many people were unsurprised by that result—
disappointed and saddened perhaps, but not surprised. Mr. Garner’s
death was yet another unintended consequence of the Broken Windows
theory. Mr. Garner’s alleged crime the day he died—selling loose
cigarettes—was something he had been arrested for and convicted of a
number of times before. And his death—after telling the officers that
being arrested over loosies had to end that day—as well as the
subsequent failure to indict the officer for his death, only fed the lack of
trust in the criminal justice system felt by his overpoliced neighborhood
in Staten Island, as the NYPD continued to roll onto its blocks to
enforce what had to feel like one-sided zero-tolerance policing.
Poor communities of color in New York City experience a police
presence that feels too much like an occupying army 30 and too little like
a police force committed to preserving peace, reducing fear, and
maintaining order by protecting the lives of all citizens, regardless of the
neighborhood in which they live, by treating them “with courtesy,
professionalism, and respect.” 31 Indeed, if the mayor’s faith in Broken
Windows 32 were matched by a concomitant effort to repair the decaying
29 See J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict
Officer in Eric Garner Chokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-deathof-eric-garner.html.
30 See Joseph Goldstein, ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Ebbs, but Still Hangs Over Brooklyn Lives, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014) [hereinafter Goldstein, ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Ebbs], http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/09/20/nyregion/friskings-ebb-but-still-hang-over-brooklyn-lives.html; see also Dan Balz &
Scott Clement, On Racial Issues, America Is Divided Both Black and White and Red and Blue,
WASH. POST (Dec. 27, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/on-racial-issuesamerica-is-divided-both-black-and-white-and-red-and-blue/2014/12/26/3d2964c8-8d12-11e4a085-34e9b9f09a58_story.html; Doug Mataconis, Poll Find[s] Wide Racial Divisions Over
Confidence in Law Enforcement and the Justice System, OUTSIDE BELTWAY (Dec. 7, 2014),
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/poll-find-wide-racial-divisions-over-confidence-in-lawenforcement-and-the-justice-system; Michael Wines, Reaction to Ferguson Decision Shows
Racial Divide Remains Over Views of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/26/us/after-ferguson-announcement-a-racial-divide-remains-overviews-of-justice.html.
31 NYPD Mission, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/administration/
mission.shtml (last visited Dec. 21, 2015); see also Ginia Bellafante, In New York Public
Housing, Policing Broken Lights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Bellafante, Policing
Broken Lights], http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/30/nyregion/in-new-york-public-housingpolicing-broken-lights.html.
32 Erin Durkin, Sarah Ryley & Jennifer Fermino, De Blasio Administration Defends ‘Broken
Windows’ Policing After Daily News Analysis, but Says it Should Be Respectful, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Aug. 5, 2014, 1:53 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/de-blasio-defendsbroken-windows-policing-daily-news-anaylsis-article-1.1891943; Jennifer Fermino & Larry
McShane, De Blasio on City Council Decriminalization Proposal: I Agree with NYPD’s Bratton
on ‘Broken Windows’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015, 8:48 PM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/de-blasio-agrees-bratton-broken-windows-article1.2194751; Ken Auletta, Fixing Broken Windows, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2015), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/09/07/fixing-broken-windows (“In April [2015], de Blasio
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infrastructure in the city’s most policed communities, then the light
bulbs might have been replaced in the stairwell of the Louis Pink Public
Housing complex, and officers doing yet another vertical patrol down a
darkened stairwell in that complex might not have shot at Akai Gurley
and he might still be alive. 33
These incidents and too many others like them were the backdrop
to the Symposium that was held at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law 34 on December 3–4, 2014. Its purpose was to initiate a set of
conversations to help assess where we are, how we got here, and to
consider alternatives to New York City’s current hyperaggressive,
racialized Broken Windows policing.
The Broken Windows theory emerged from a five-page essay by
George Kelling and James Wilson, published in 1982 in the Atlantic
Monthly. The essay argued that a single broken window left
unaddressed will quickly result in a building full of broken windows;
and that a car with a cracked windshield, allowed to remain on the
street, will, if not repaired, be quickly vandalized. The authors wrote,
“The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window.” 35 As
Ginia Bellafante of the New York Times observed more than thirty years
later, “We have come to think of ‘broken windows’ in terms of the need
to make arrests for minor offenses, the imperative to get rid of squeegee
men and other avatars of nuisance.” 36
Yet in spite of its current practice by the NYPD, Kelling and
Wilson recently maintained that their theory was not, at its inception,
committed to hyperaggressive, high volume, low-level, “quality-of-life”
arrests. 37 Rather, they insisted the core of their theory was that “ruined
again expressed support for the broken-windows approach. ‘I want to emphasize, my vision of
quality-of-life policing and my vision related to the broken-windows strategy is the same as
Commissioner Bratton’s . . . .’”).
33 Bellafante, Policing Broken Lights, supra note 31; Ginia Bellafante, The Dark Side of
‘Broken Windows’ Policing, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/
nyregion/the-dark-side-of-broken-windows-policing.html. For a fuller account of the human
cost of this incident and of the institutional conditions that contributed to it, see Alex Ronan,
“His Life Matters”: The Story of Akai Gurley, BUZZFEED (Jan. 20, 2016, 12:07 AM), http://
www.buzzfeed.com/alexronan/the-life-and-death-of-akai-gurley#.fslOeYQvLB.
34 See generally Cardozo Law Review Symposium: The Underbelly of the Beast:
Misdemeanor Practice in the Era of Broken Windows and Saturation Policing (Dec. 3–4, 2014).
35 Kelling & Wilson, supra note 20.
36 Bellafante, Policing Broken Lights, supra note 31.
37 New York City Police Commissioner William Bratton uses the term “quality-of-life”
policing synonymously with “Broken Windows,” to mean focusing on “the little things” like
fare evasion and graffiti. WILLIAM J. BRATTON, NYPD, BROKEN WINDOWS AND QUALITY-OFLIFE POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY 1 (2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/
analysis_and_planning/qol.pdf. No crime would be considered too petty to address. As
Commissioner Bratton explains,
More misdemeanor arrests ultimately led to fewer felony arrests because the NYPD
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things—broken windows, cracked sidewalks, littered pathways—must
get fixed” for the health of the community. 38 They maintained that if the
shattered glass of a broken window were allowed to litter the street
rather than be quickly removed, and the window repaired, the
community as a whole would suffer. 39
Broadly speaking, as Ginia Bellefante recently observed, Kelling
and Wilson—in the notable absence of supporting data or field
studies 40—claimed that “physical decay begets the moral kind;

was preventing crime more effectively. By applying summonses to violations and
arrests to misdemeanor crimes, rather than looking the other way because these
offenses are “too insignificant,” officers were correcting conditions early. Arresting
someone for a misdemeanor frequently prevents him from graduating to committing
felonies, for which severe sanctions like prison may result.
Id. at 3. Accounts filed contemporaneously with the program’s implementation give concrete
meaning to Commissioner Bratton’s theory. Writing for the New York Times in 1994,
Norimitsu Onishi reported:
Mr. Favia, a father of two, was one of 33 people arrested yesterday as part of the New
York City Police Department's crackdown on so-called quality-of-life offenses. Like
Mr. Favia, they had failed to pay summonses issued for such transgressions as
drinking and urinating in public, playing their radios too loud and riding bicycles on
sidewalks.
Norimitsu Onishi, A Quality-of-Life Offense? It Could End Up in Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (June 30,
1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/30/nyregion/a-quality-of-life-offense-it-could-endup-in-arrest.html. For a critical view that places “quality-of-life” policing—and the advertising
campaign that accompanied it—in a broader political context, see ALEX S. VITALE, CITY OF
DISORDER (2008), and the sources cited in note 39, infra.
38 See Bellafante, Policing Broken Lights, supra note 31.
39 See George Kelling, Don’t Blame My ‘Broken Windows’ Theory for Poor Policing,
POLITICO MAG. (Aug. 11, 2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/08/brokenwindows-theory-poor-policing-ferguson-kelling-121268. Kelling protested that his Broken
Windows theory was never predicated on a high volume of nonfelony, low-level arrests. But see
Harcourt, supra note 20. Bernard Harcourt’s rebuttal conclusively demonstrated that, by design
and in its current New York iteration, Broken Windows depended on a high volume of
nonfelony arrests, in spite of the absence of data demonstrating a causal link between
hyperaggressive nonfelony arrests and a reduction in serious or violent crime. Id.; see also
BRATTON, supra note 37; Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence
from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006).
40 Prominent criminologist and Columbia University law professor Jeffrey Fagan has
argued that “[t]here’s no good scientific evidence that broken-windows works or has much to
do with crime . . . . And the few claims for it that people try to make have been contested. None
of them stand up to really close examination.” Auletta, supra note 32. Fagan noted that while
the crime rate in New York fell in the nineteen-nineties when Broken Windows was applied on
a city-wide basis, it also declined in San Diego, Houston, Dallas, and other cities that were not
applying “Broken Windows” policing. Id. Fagan concluded that “Bratton can say all he wants
that broken-windows works, and he can look at large correlations between misdemeanor
arrests and declines in crime, but there’s no plausible connection between the two.” Id. Bratton,
in essence, concedes the point, telling Ken Auletta during a recent interview: “You’re not going
to find the scientific study that can support broken-windows one way or the other . . . . The
evidence I rely on is what my eyes show me.” Id. Bratton pointed not to data but instead to “the
reduction of fear” that he sees in rejuvenated neighborhoods like Times Square. Id.
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appearances must be maintained for civility to cohere.” 41 Even more
important than making arrests, however, the theory if taken to its logical
and reasonable conclusion would require that we actually replace the
broken windows, scrub graffiti off the walls, and repair that which is
broken in order to avert further accretive and corrosive deterioration of
the community. Only that kind of concerted and purposeful action, in
conjunction with nuanced “community oriented, problem-oriented
policing,” seems likely to reduce crime and improve the relationship
between New York City’s minority citizens and the police. 42
The authors were speaking both literally and metaphorically: their
concern was to fix, repair, and restore not only the windows, but also,
on a more profound level, the institutions and infrastructure that shape
and define the quality of life in communities. And yet, disturbingly, but
perhaps unsurprisingly, as City University of New York law professor
Steve Zeidman observed, “If the problem is a broken window[,] they
should fix the window . . . . But somehow we don’t fix the window, we
just arrest people who start hanging out by the broken window.” 43
See Bellafante, Policing Broken Lights, supra note 31.
For a description of that approach to policing and its impact on a community, see Mark
Obbie, One Street in Minnesota Separates Radically Different Policing Strategies, TAKEAPART
(Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.takepart.com/feature/2015/12/14/community-policing. It might be
that in the coming year the NYPD may seek, at least in part, to move closer to this model. In a
recent essay advancing the claim that the NYPD was “winning the war on crime,”
Commissioner Bratton noted that in the last two calendar years, New York City had
experienced a “decline in overall index crime of 5.9%; two of the three lowest years since 1958
for murder,” and highlighted new strategies being implemented. He described how “precision
policing”—“launching a variety of intensive investigations into local pockets of violence,”
would be implemented in conjunction with the establishment of a “new set of expectations for
patrol officers” requiring them to “meet with community members and work as active problem
solvers in their assigned sectors.” Bill Bratton, The NYPD: Winning the War on Crime, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS (Jan. 20, 2016, 4:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nypd-winningwar-crime-article-1.2502562. Bratton’s essay prompted an immediate response by Robert
Gangi, the Director of the Police Reform Organizing Project. Robert Gangi, Letter to the Editor,
Don’t Buy Bratton’s Bogus Boasts, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 23, 2016, 3:52 AM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/opinion/january-23-tricks-ant-attacks-eagle-hate-article-1.2506133.
Writing in the New York Daily News, Gangi characterized Bratton’s description as a selfserving, “false narrative.” Id. Gangi argued that Bratton’s claim that “today’s NYPD practices a
kinder, gentler kind of policing,” ignored the facts that “by any applicable criteria,” the NYPD
“continues to harass and sanction low-income people of color for engaging in low-level
infractions or innocuous activities that have been virtually decriminalized in well-off white
communities.” Id. Only time will tell how the most scrutinized communities experience the
new directives and policies.
43 Emily Stephenson & Aruna Viswanatha, New York Chokehold Death Brings Attack on
‘Broken Windows’ Doctrine, REUTERS (Dec. 6, 2014, 4:29 AM) (quoting professor Zeidman),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/06/us-usa-new-york-chokehold-politics-idUSKCN0
JJ2CN20141206#VyB67lMe1ofQco4F.97. New York City Councilman Ritchie Torres made a
similar point when commenting on the death of Akai Gurley: “The story of Akai Gurley evinces
the contradictions between two competing theories of broken windows . . . . Should broken
windows be about policing the behavior of the window breakers or should it be about repairing
41
42
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More than twenty years after the advent of citywide Broken
Windows policing, New York remains two cities, divided on race and
class lines; its fissure no more clearly revealed than through the prism of
its criminal justice system. 44 Indeed, while private funding has restored
Central Park from the dustbowl it was in the early 1990s into an emerald
gem and “national treasure,” 45 the physical condition of New York
City’s public housing continues to deteriorate—windows remain
broken, stairwells remain unlit, mold festers. 46 As income and economic
inequality in New York City increased, 47 its homeless population, absent
adequate social services, swelled to an all-time high. 48 Schools in the
most economically strapped communities—the have-nots in our
mayor’s tale of two cities—remain underfunded and underperforming. 49
Students in those schools are too often subjected to zero-tolerance
disciplinary policies and suffer the consequences of exclusionary
discipline: their lives shattered, not restored, by out-of-school
suspension and relocation to secondary placements that, with disturbing
frequency, end not with graduation out of high school, but into the
juvenile and then adult criminal justice systems. 50
the broken windows and improving the quality of the built environment of public housing?”
Ronan, supra note 33.
44 See Steven Zeidman, Equal Protection Examined in the Context of Policing, N.Y.L.J. (Feb.
7, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202641893657/Equal-Protection-Examinedin-the-Context-of-Policing#ixzz2sfeu7WrK.
45 See Douglas Martin, City Offers Private Group Contract to Maintain Central Park, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 6, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/06/nyregion/city-offers-private-groupcontract-to-maintain-central-park.html; Press Release, Central Park Conservancy, Central Park
Conservancy Announces the Campaign for Central Park, http://support.centralparknyc.org/
site/DocServer?docID=143.
46 See Jennifer Gonnerman, A Daughter’s Death, NEW YORKER (Oct. 5, 2015), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/10/05/a-daughters-death.
47 See ESTELLE SOMMEILLER & MARK PRICE, ECON. POLICY INST., THE INCREASINGLY
UNEQUAL STATES OF AMERICA: INCOME INEQUALITY BY STATE, 1917 TO 2012 (2015), http://
www.epi.org/publication/income-inequality-by-state-1917-to-2012; Hana R. Alberts, Wealth
Gap Champ Manhattan Is U.S.’s ‘Most Unequal’ County, CURBED (Apr. 21, 2015), http://
ny.curbed.com/archives/2015/04/21/wealth_gap_champ_manhattan_is_uss_most_unequal_
county.php.
48 See supra note 3; see also Bellafante, Policing Broken Lights, supra note 31; Schwirtz, supra
note 19.
49 See, e.g., Richard Rothstein, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated Schools, and
Segregated Neighborhoods: A Constitutional Insult, 7 RACE & SOC. PROBS. 21 (2015), http://
www.epi.org/publication/the-racial-achievement-gap-segregated-schools-and-segregatedneighborhoods-a-constitutional-insult.
50 See ELORA MUKHERJEE, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, CRIMINALIZING THE CLASSROOM:
THE OVER-POLICING OF NEW YORK CITY SCHOOLS (2007), http://www.nyclu.org/pdfs/
criminalizing_the_classroom_report.pdf; SAMANTHA POWNALL, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
A, B, C, D, STPP: HOW SCHOOL DISCIPLINE FEEDS THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE (2013),
http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/nyclu_STPP_1021_FINAL.pdf; Molly Knefel, The
School-to-Prison Pipeline: A Nationwide Problem for Equal Rights, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 7,
2013), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/the-school-to-prison-pipeline-a-nationwide-

OBERMAN.JOHNSON.INTRO.37.3.3 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

2/23/2016 2:05 PM

B R O K E N W I N D O WS I N T R O D U C T I O N

945

As social institutions in New York City’s poorest neighborhoods
remain largely unrepaired, Police Commissioner William Bratton and
Mayor Bill de Blasio hold fast to Broken Windows. They in turn are
chastised by former police commissioners and mayors, who lament any
efforts to reshape police practice, and issue doomsday warnings of
approaching urban Armageddon. 51 More worrisome, however, is that
two decades of zero tolerance for Broken Windows policing has failed to
translate into zero tolerance for that which is literally broken in poor
communities of color. 52 It is not a giant leap to wonder whether what

problem-for-equal-rights-20131107; Editorial, The School-to-Prison Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES (May
29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/30/opinion/new-york-citys-school-to-prisonpipeline.html; N.Y. Civil Liberties Union, Project Liberty: School to Prison Pipeline, YOUTUBE
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DXR51vZCfVY.
51 See Al Baker & J. David Goodman, Gunplay Rises in New York, Reviving Issue for de
Blasio, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/nyregion/gunplayrises-in-new-york-reviving-issue-for-de-blasio.html; John Del Signore, Shootings & Gun Deaths
on the Rise in NYC, GOTHAMIST (June 2, 2015, 10:01 AM), http://gothamist.com/2015/06/02/
shootings_homicide_nypd.php; Rocco Parascandola et al., Murders Up 20% in 2015 in Year-toYear Comparison, NYPD Says, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 3, 2015, 12:04 AM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/murders-20-2015-year-to-year-comparison-nypdarticle-1.2134509; Jamie Schram et al., Shootings Spike in NYC Over the Last Year, N.Y. POST
(June 10, 2014, 2:42 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/06/10/shootings-spike-in-nyc-over-the-lastyear. While crime rates may vary by week, month, and season, what remains constant is that
those living in New York City’s poorest neighborhoods are both most actively policed and bear
the heaviest immediate burden of whatever crime is committed. As Jennifer Gonnerman
recently observed,
Last year, there were three hundred and thirty-three homicides in New York City, the
lowest number of any year on record. But almost twenty per cent of the shootings in
the city occur in public-housing developments, which hold less than five per cent of
the population. Violent crime is so concentrated in some projects—places like the
Ingersoll Houses, in Brooklyn, and the Castle Hill Houses, in the Bronx—that to
residents it can feel as if shootings and sidewalk memorials were part of everyday life.
Gonnerman, supra note 46.
52 For example,
[f]orty-five hundred people live in the nine brick towers that make up the Grant
Houses. The Manhattanville Houses, with six buildings, are home to three thousand
people. According to the New York City Housing Authority, the average household
income for both projects is twenty-four thousand dollars a year, and nearly forty per
cent of the residents between the ages of eighteen and sixty-one are unemployed. The
projects are more than fifty years old and in severe disrepair.
Gonnerman, supra note 46. In addition,
[m]ost of the city’s three hundred and twenty-eight housing projects are in poor
condition, but, in 2013, Bill de Blasio, then the city’s public advocate, issued a report
showing that the Grant Houses had more “outstanding work-order requests” than
any other project in the city. Conditions such as lobby doors with broken locks and
stairwells without lights exacerbate an already serious crime problem. In 2014,
the News reported that “some of the city’s most crime-ridden housing projects are
the same developments most in need of immediate repairs.”
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may in fact be broken is the underlying theory of policing that seems
predicated on occupy and degrade, rather than protect and serve. 53 Even
as the NYPD replaces the unconstitutional-as-practiced “StopQuestion-and-Frisk” with programs like Operation Omnipresence, 54
New York City’s violent crime rate continues to decline. Despite some
upticks, the rate and number of felony arrests continue to decline
significantly, maintaining a trend that had begun years before the
current mayor assumed office. This trend is mirrored nationally,
regardless of the policing strategy employed in the communities
involved. 55
Id. (quoting Greg B. Smith, Most Crime-Ridden Housing Projects Are Also Buildings in Greatest
Need of Repairs, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 6, 2014, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/nyc-crime/exclusive-crime-ridden-projects-greatest-repairs-article-1.1964379.
Most
recently, Ginia Bellafante underscored this point in connection with an incident that took place
in the Osborne Playground in the Brownsville section of Brooklyn on the night of January 7,
2016, that resulted in five teenagers being arrested and charged with rape. See Ginia Bellafante,
Brownsville’s Broken Windows, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/
17/nyregion/brownsvilles-broken-windows.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&version=
Moth-Visible&moduleDetail=inside-nyt-region-1&module=inside-nyt-region&region=insidenyt-region&WT.nav=inside-nyt-region&_r=0. The playground, Bellafante noted, had been left
unlocked, and three of the four lights intended to illuminate the section of the playground in
which the incident occurred were broken. Id. “Although the events that unfolded at the Osborn
Playground on Jan. 7 are still unclear,” Bellafante observed,
what seems obvious, as it did in the case of Akai Gurley, mistakenly shot to death in a
dark stairway in the Louis Pink Houses in East New York when a light bulb was out,
is the inconsistency with which ‘broken windows’ policing is practiced. The
philosophy behind it is that safety and civility arise as a function of well-maintained
public spaces, and yet, not surprisingly, it is the challenged neighborhoods that are
the most poorly tended. Playgrounds in Brooklyn Heights, for example, are locked at
night, precisely, one assumes, to protect the well-established from whatever might
erupt if the ill-behaved were to congregate there.
Id.

53 See NYPD Mission, supra note 31 (“The mission of the New York City Police Department
is to enhance the quality of life in New York City by working in partnership with the
community to enforce the law, preserve peace, reduce fear, and maintain order. The
Department is committed to accomplishing its mission to protect the lives and property of all
citizens of New York City by treating every citizen with courtesy, professionalism, and respect,
and to enforce the laws impartially, fighting crime both through deterrence and the relentless
pursuit of criminals.”).
54 See Goldstein, ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ Ebbs, supra note 30; see also Stephen Farrell,
Omnipresence: New Stop-and-Frisk?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2014, 7:17 AM), http://
www.nytimes.com/video/nyregion/100000003045311/omnipresence-ill-be-watching-you.html;
John Surico, Omnipresence Is the Newest NYPD Tactic You’ve Never Heard of, VICE (Oct. 20,
2014), http://www.vice.com/read/omnipresence-is-the-newest-nypd-tactic-youve-never-heardof-1020.
55 See Matt Flegenheimer, De Blasio Calls New York ‘the Safest Big City’ Despite Some Crime
Statistics, N.Y. TIMES (June 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/03/nyregion/de-blasiocalls-new-york-the-safest-big-city-despite-some-crime-statistics.html. In spite of the dire
warning issued almost gleefully by defenders of Broken Windows—ostensibly out of concern
for preserving the values of black lives in the midst of aggressive policing—hard data failed to
support the doomsday prophets. See Heather Mac Donald, Opinion, The New Nationwide
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And yet, we—or at least significant numbers of poor black and
Hispanic New Yorkers—continue to live in an era of mass
criminalization. 56 Violent crime in New York City continues to
decrease. And, as a recent study conducted by the Misdemeanor Justice
Project at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice reported, the number
of encounters between the police and civilians—stops, arrests, moving
violations, and criminal summonses—has declined from a peak of 2.63
million in 2011, to 1.82 million in 2014. But the decline was driven
overwhelmingly by a steep reduction in the number of stop-and-frisks
from a high of 685,724 in 2011, to a low of 45,787 in 2014. 57 Over the
same period, by sharp contrast, misdemeanor arrests, which had peaked
at 249,639 in 2010, decreased only to 219,917 in 2014. 58
Thus, Broken Windows continues to direct arrest practices,
charging decisions, and bail determinations, and makes New York City’s
criminal justice system appear less equitable and distinctly not colorblind—thereby mirroring the ongoing divide in American society. 59
Crime Wave, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 2015, 6:27 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-newnationwide-crime-wave-1432938425. A recent study completed by the Brennan Center for
Justice demonstrated that while there has been a slight and disturbing uptick in homicides,
especially in five cities (i.e., Baltimore, Detroit, Milwaukee, New Orleans, and St. Louis),
“analysis shows, overall violent crime—which includes not just murder, but robbery, larceny,
assault and burglary—is projected to be 1.5 percent lower in 2015 than 2014.” Editorial, False
Alarms About a National Crime Wave, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/11/27/opinion/false-alarms-about-a-national-crime-wave.html; see also MATTHEW
FRIEDMAN ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIME IN 2015: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
(2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Crime_in_2015.pdf;
Radley Balko, There’s No Evidence of a ‘New Nationwide Crime Wave,’ WASH. POST (June 8,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/06/08/theres-no-evidenceof-a-new-nationwide-crime-wave. But see Mark Berman, FBI: Murders and Other Violent
Crimes Increased Last Year, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-nation/wp/2016/01/19/fbi-murders-and-other-violent-crimes-increased-last-year/
?postshare=2381453305236380&tid=ss_mail.
56 See, e.g., Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 703–12
(2005) (recounting that, in recent decades, America has criminalized behavior that had
previously been considered legal). Assertions that the era of mass incarceration may have
passed are significantly premature. See Andrew Cohen & Oliver Roeder, Way Too Early to
Declare Victory in War Against Mass Incarceration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (May 21, 2014),
http://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/way-too-early-declare-victory-war-against-massincarceration (“[T]he incarceration rate is decreasing, but . . . not by much. It’s down 5.5
percent since its 2007 peak. Since 2001, it’s up 1.6 percent. An unscientific word for this trend
would be ‘flat.’”).
57 See PREETI CHAUHAN ET AL., JOHN JAY COLL. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, TRACKING
ENFORCEMENT RATES IN NEW YORK CITY: 2003–2014, at 21–22 (2015), http://
www.jjay.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/News/Enforcement_Rate_Report.pdf.
58 Id. at 10.
59 See, e.g., KUTATELADZE ET AL., supra note 6; K. Babe Howell, Prosecutorial Discretion and
the Duty to Seek Justice in an Overburdened Criminal Justice System, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
285, 286 (2014) (“[S]ubstantial racial disparities arise because zero-tolerance policing is
primarily pursued in poor urban neighborhoods of color. The result is that black and Latino
people are routinely and aggressively prosecuted under statutes and local ordinances that go
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Zero-tolerance policing, as applied to the school system, pushes black
and Hispanic kids out of mainstream schools and into secondary
placements, the juvenile justice system, and finally, into adult jails. 60
Nonfelony arrests and convictions often keep people in jail, or require
them to return to court for multiple appearances to resolve their cases. 61
Those case resolutions too often impose not only the stain of a
criminal conviction, but also derivative consequences that may include:
removal from this country, denial of citizenship, limitation on one’s
ability to travel out of and re-enter this country, removal from public
housing, termination or suspension of employment, rejection of
licensure, limited access to or removal from educational opportunities,
and denied access to the financial support that may be necessary to
make educational opportunities more than a theoretical possibility. 62
largely unenforced in white and wealthy areas. . . . [thereby undermining] procedural
justice . . . because over-policing increases the number of cases in lower criminal courts,
overwhelming prosecutors, defenders, and judges.”).
60 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. A recent Bureau of Justice Statistics report
noted that the indigence rate for state felony cases was 43% in 1963, while “[t]oday
approximately 80% of people charged with crime are poor.” Paul D. Butler, Essay, Poor People
Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2179–81 (2013).
61 Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Misdemeanor Justice: Control Without Conviction, 119 AM. J.
SOC. 351 (2013). Here, in brief, Kohler-Hausmann argues that misdemeanor arrests, even
absent a resulting criminal conviction, serve as a form of social control by imposing three costs:
The arrest itself creates a criminal record that is logged into a statewide data base, and “marks”
the arrestee, allowing the system to measure the individual against a rubric based on a number
of variables, including history of arrests, convictions, court attendance, and successful
completion of obligations imposed to secure a disposition. The second form of control imposed
by misdemeanor arrests is the time-cost imposed on the arrestee: defendants often must make
multiple mandatory court appearances to obtain final resolution of their cases, with attendant
consequences that could include lost work, lost time in school, and child care costs. Finally, to
secure a final disposition, individuals often are required to perform some task in a court
ordered or approved program that subjects them to ongoing oversight and control. Id.; see also
Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 633–
35 (2014). This multiyear ethnography of judgments issued by New York City’s misdemeanor
courts persuasively argued that the plea driven system sorts defendants charged with
misdemeanors and assigns outcomes based not on the strength or weakness of evidence, but
instead on the basis of the defendants’ prior contacts with the system. Kohler-Hausmann’s
quantitative analysis demonstrated that prior misdemeanor convictions are the single greatest
predictor of future misdemeanor convictions; and that New York City’s criminal justice system,
at least as it applies to those charged with nonfelonies—overwhelmingly economically
disadvantaged black and Hispanic men—functions to mark, sort, and categorize them as
minor, moderate, or frequent rule-breakers for ease of future oversight and management by the
state. Id.; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1043 (2013).
62 For a general and comprehensive introduction to the scope of the consequences that may
attach with a conviction or arrest, see MARGARET COLGATE LOVE ET AL., COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2013), and SPECIAL
COMM. ON COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N,
RE-ENTRY AND REINTEGRATION: THE ROAD TO PUBLIC SAFETY (2006), http://www.nysba.org/
workarea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=26857. The ABA has recently completed an encyclopedic
catalogue of 45,000 regulations that prohibit individuals with criminal histories from engaging
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In addition, current nonfelony arrest practices in New York City
are overwhelmingly racialized and geographically specific, imposing
their burden and cost on a small number of neighborhoods and
communities—all poor, all marginalized, and all overwhelmingly black
and Hispanic. 63 Without intending to conflate causation and
correlation, that data supports an argument that current policing and
prosecution policies effectively criminalize race, poverty, drug
addiction, and mental illness, while “tagging” a growing class of young
black and Hispanic people in order to oversee and manage them by
repeatedly pulling them into the criminal justice system with low-level,
nonfelony arrests. 64 The system’s unfairness is further exacerbated by
the degree to which it functionally denies due process that is only
exhausted when the accused proceeds to trial where she enjoys the full
panoply of her Sixth Amendment, Article One, Section 6 rights. 65
in various civic activities—from voting to getting a barber’s license. In introducing its data, the
ABA emphasized how all but impossible it is for anyone to be cognizant of, and therefore
protect against, all the consequences that may attach to a criminal conviction:
Persons convicted of crime are subject to a wide variety of legal and regulatory
sanctions and restrictions in addition to the sentence imposed by the court. These socalled “collateral consequences” of conviction have been promulgated with little
coordination in disparate sections of state and federal codes, which makes it difficult
for anyone to identify all of the penalties and disabilities that are triggered by
conviction of a particular offense. While collateral consequences have been a familiar
feature of the American justice system since colonial times, they have become more
important and more problematic in the past 20 years for three reasons: they are more
numerous and more severe, they affect more people, and they are harder to avoid or
mitigate. As a result, millions of Americans are consigned to a kind of legal limbo
because at one point in their past they committed a crime.
Project Description, NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION
(2013), http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/description (last visited Dec. 22, 2015). To
examine a current New York database, see New York, NAT’L INVENTORY OF COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES
OF
CONVICTION,
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/search/
?jurisdiction=35 (last visited Dec. 22, 2015). For a concrete example of the human dimension of
collateral consequences, see Shaila Dewan, The Collateral Victims of Criminal Justice, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/sunday-review/the-collateralvictims-of-criminal-justice.html. As Dewan noted, “[c]ollateral damage is not limited to the
guilty party. When money for fines or bail is needed, often a relative pays. When prisoners are
released, often with no job prospects, no driver’s license, and crippling court debt, their families
bear the burden.” Id.
63 Significant data on which this assertion is based may be located in a number of
publications. See e.g., CHAUHAN ET AL., supra note 21; CJA ANNUAL REPORT 2013, supra note
16; Dewan, supra note 62; see also Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC.
937 (2003). For information about direct health consequences that derive from mass arrests and
resulting incarcerations, see DAVID CLOUD, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, ON LIFE SUPPORT: PUBLIC
HEALTH IN THE AGE OF MASS INCARCERATION (2014), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/
resources/downloads/on-life-support-public-health-mass-incarceration-report.pdf.
64 See sources cited supra notes 6, 21, 63; see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 61.
65 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 6; see also Kohler-Hausmann, supra
note 61; Natapoff, supra note 61.
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To state that which is apparent to even the most casual observer of
New York City’s criminal court practice, that practice provides the
overwhelming majority of those prosecuted with what might be
described, at best, as “Due Process–light.” The current criminal justice
system depends overwhelmingly on pleas. For example, 172,490 out of
the 359,475 cases arraigned in New York City in 2014—nearly half—
were resolved with guilty pleas at arraignment. Arraignment is the
initial court appearance where the great majority of defendants have
met their assigned lawyer only a matter of minutes prior to appearing
before the judge; it is a time when neither the prosecutor nor the defense
attorney has had the opportunity to probe the factual or legal strengths
and weaknesses of the charges being brought. 66 These cases are resolved
quickly, often within minutes of the assigned attorney first meeting her
client, in what has repeatedly been described as cookie-cutter, “meet
’em, greet ’em, and plead ’em” assembly line justice. 67
Of the cases that survive arraignment, few are resolved by actual
litigation—the taking of sworn testimony, and the testing of the
government’s proof with a final assessment on legal sufficiency by a
finder-of-fact. Indeed, in 2014, the city’s 359,475 arraigned cases
produced only 580 trials—of which only 175 were in front of a jury; the
remaining 405 were decided by a judge. 68 That year was hardly an
anomaly: in calendar year 2013, 364,583 nonfelony cases were
vacuumed into the system, yet those cases produced only 209 jury
trials—a meager 0.0006%—in which the accused thoroughly exercised
all the due process rights accorded by the Constitution. 69
Broken Windows policing has flooded the criminal justice system
with a volume of low-level offenses that dramatically exceeds the
system’s capacity for nuanced, due process based, adversarially-tested
resolution. NYPD arrest policies, thus, in significant part, have helped
shape a managerial, nonadjudicative, order-maintenance system of
criminal justice that reflects the growing racial and socioeconomic
divide between New York City’s haves and have-nots, and exacerbates
the racial tension that undermines public trust in the police. 70 In many
66 See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF CLERK, CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF N.Y., 2014 ANNUAL
REPORT 19 (2015) [hereinafter 2014 CRIMINAL COURT REPORT], https://www.nycourts.gov/
COURTS/nyc/criminal/cc_annl_rpt_2014.pdf.
67 See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS,
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR
COURTS 33 (2009) (quoting Joseph Bellacosa, Opinion, In Defense of a Proper Defense,
NEWSDAY (July 27, 2008, 8:00 PM), http://www.newsday.com/opinion/in-defense-of-a-properdefense-1.563775),
https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID
=20808; see also AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT (2009).
68 See 2014 CRIMINAL COURT REPORT, supra note 66, at 19, 51.
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Joseph Goldstein, Safer Era Tests Wisdom of ‘Broken Windows’ Focus on Minor
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ways, nonfelony arrests and prosecutions are at the root of the flawed
justice system that, as it currently exists, too often degrades individuals,
depletes families, weakens communities, and in these ways poses a
threat to our democracy. 71
Crime, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/25/nyregion/safer-eratests-wisdom-of-broken-windows-focus-on-minor-crime-in-new-york-city.html; Sarah Ryley
et al., Daily News Analysis Finds Racial Disparities in Summonses for Minor Violations in
‘Broken Windows’ Policing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 4, 2014, 2:00 AM), http://www.nydaily
news.com/new-york/summons-broken-windows-racial-disparity-garner-article-1.1890567. As
Charles Blow argued in a recent Op-Ed, how one views Broken Windows policing “completely
depends on your vantage point, which is heavily influenced by racial realities and socioeconomics. For poor black people, it means that they have to be afraid of the cops as well as the
criminals.” Charles M. Blow, Opinion, Romanticizing ‘Broken Windows’ Policing, N.Y. TIMES
(June 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/04/opinion/charles-m-blow-romanticizingbroken-windows-policing.html. “People in these black communities . . . are being asked to
make an impossible choice: accept the sprawling, ruinous collateral damage—including killings
of unarmed black people—in police departments’ wars on crime, or complain about excessive
force and attempt to curtail it only to have criminals roam free” as officers curtail their
legitimate efforts to protect and serve. Id. But the degree to which Broken Windows policing
has had a radically disparate racial impact is not specific to New York. To the contrary,
the broken windows theory is still used in police departments across the country,
resulting in racial profiling and unleashing other indiscriminate policies on black
people, such as stop-and-frisk, that are never similarly applied in white
neighborhoods. The failure of broken windows to do anything except discriminate is
a constant theme running through investigations of police departments by the Justice
Department under President Obama.
It found major patterns of excessive force in Cleveland, Albuquerque, Seattle, and
Miami and harsh treatment of Latinos in traffic stops in Maricopa County, Ariz. and
East Haven, Conn.
It found discriminatory stops of pedestrians and drivers of color in Newark, N.J., and
Antelope Valley, Calif., and discriminatory policing of people of color, gay citizens,
and women trying to report domestic violence in New Orleans.
Derrick Z. Jackson, ‘Broken Windows,’ Broken Policy, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 29, 2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/12/29/broken-windows-broken-policy/WM8h
UySUL0YerJq2S2Ay1N/story.html. In short, Broken Windows policing has split the cities in
which it has been applied into the world of the haves—who are not aggressively policed—and
the have-nots—who are poor black and brown people. See id. For helpful context, see Butler,
supra note 60 (noting that, according to a Bureau of Justice Statistics report, the indigence rate
for state felony cases was 43% in 1963, while “[t]oday approximately 80% of people charged
with crime are poor”).
71 See BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., supra note 67, at 12–13; Editorial, End Mass Incarceration
Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/opinion/sunday/endmass-incarceration-now.html (“The severity [of current criminalization and incarceration
policies] is evident in the devastation wrought on America’s poorest and least educated,
destroying neighborhoods and families. From 1980 to 2000, the number of children with
fathers in prison rose from 350,000 to 2.1 million. Since race and poverty overlap so
significantly, the weight of our criminal justice experiment continues to fall overwhelmingly on
communities of color, and particularly on young black men.”); see also Editorial, Forcing Black
Men Out of Society, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/26/opinion/
sunday/forcing-black-men-out-of-society.html; Justin Wolfers et al., 1.5 Million Missing Black
Men, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/
20/upshot/missing-black-men.html.
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In the last eighteen months, we have been unfortunate witnesses to
the literally fatal consequences of Broken Windows policing. James
Murdough died in a cell on Rikers Island after being arrested for
misdemeanor trespass. 72 Eric Garner was killed on a street in
Tompkinsville, Staten Island, when officers attempted to arrest him for
selling a “loosie”—a single cigarette. 73 Akai Gurley died while innocently
walking down the stairs in an unlit stairwell in the Louis H. Pink Houses
in East New York, Brooklyn. Mr. Gurley was the victim of a vertical
patrol, one of the instruments of zero-tolerance policing, and of New
York City’s failure to fix the broken light bulbs in his building’s
stairwell. 74
These events should give us pause and encourage us to reconsider
the wisdom of zero-tolerance policies.
Reforming hyperaggressive, quality-of-life, Broken Windows
policing, as well as the culture of the criminal courts, is the most
concrete, immediate, long-term, and necessary way to alter the criminal
justice system in New York City and throughout the United States. In a
recent essay, Jelani Cobb, reflecting on the events in Ferguson, Missouri,
during the summer of 2014 (and we may add Staten Island and the
Bronx, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; Baltimore, Maryland; and North
Charleston, South Carolina), 75 found equally relevant today the most
72 See Homeless Veteran ‘Baked to Death’ in New York Prison Cell, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19,
2014, 12:03 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/homeless-veteran-newyork-prison; Jake Pearson, Autopsy Says Ex-Marine Jerome Murdough Died in Rikers Island Cell
from Heat and Meds, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:54 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/12/jerome-murdough-autopsy-_n_5813452.html
(last
updated Nov. 12, 2014, 5:59 AM).
73 See Ford Fessenden, New Perspective on Eric Garner’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/03/us/2014-12-03-garner-video.html; N.Y. Daily
News, Eric Garner Video—Unedited Version, YOUTUBE (July 12, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpGxagKOkv8.
74 See Bellafante, Policing Broken Lights, supra note 31; J. David Goodman & Vivian Yee,
Officer Charged in Akai Gurley Case Debated Reporting Gunshot, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
11,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/12/nyregion/akai-gurley-shooting-deatharraignment.html. There remains the still unresolved case of eighteen-year-old unarmed
Ramarley Graham, shot and killed by an NYPD officer in the bathroom of his mother’s
apartment as he flushed a small amount of marijuana down the toilet, when the police officers
had entered with guns drawn—but without a warrant, consent, or probable cause. See Zena
Barakat & Randy Leonard, Officer Had ‘No Choice’ in Bronx Man’s Shooting, His Lawyer Says in
Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/14/nyregion/officerpleads-not-guilty-in-ramarley-graham-shooting.html; Matt Flegenheimer & Al Baker, Officer
Fatally Shoots Teenager in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/
03/nyregion/unarmed-teenager-fatally-shot-by-officer-chasing-him.html; Christopher Mathias,
Ramarley Graham's Mother Tells DOJ To Stop Dragging Its Feet, HUFFINGTON POST (July 24,
2015, 2:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ramarley-grahams-mother-tells-doj-tostop-dragging-its-feet_us_55b251b3e4b0224d8831eb6b.
75 See David A. Graham, The Shockingly Familiar Killing of Walter Scott, ATLANTIC (Apr. 8,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/04/the-shockingly-familiar-killing-of-
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salient conclusion of the Kerner Commission Report, issued in 1967 in
response to the race riots that had exploded in urban centers across the
United States in the early to mid-1960s, 76 “that the United States was
‘moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and
unequal.’” 77
It is hard to ignore how many people living in the most policed
communities throughout New York City feel about the criminal justice
system—overpoliced and improperly protected 78—which made the
Symposium held at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law so
important. Jelani Cobb writes, “Forty-seven years ago, the Kerner
Commission looked at the smoldering landscape of American cities and
asked three questions: ‘What happened? Why did it happen? What can
be done to prevent it from happening again?’” 79 The authors in this
collection of essays ask similar questions. The “what”: where we are with
the problem of mass criminalization, and the hyperarrest and
prosecution of low-level offenses that are being pursued in an overtly
racialized manner. The “so what”: why this matters; the immediate and
long-term social costs of these policies and the institutions that actualize
and process them—the trauma caused by street stops; the immediate
and long-term costs when trust is supplanted by fear, when
walter-scott/390006; Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, South Carolina Officer Is Charged
with Murder of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/08/
us/south-carolina-officer-is-charged-with-murder-in-black-mans-death.html;
Sheryl
Gay
Stolberg & Ron Nixon, Freddie Gray in Baltimore: Another City, Another Death in the Public
Eye, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/us/another-mans-deathanother-round-of-questions-for-the-police-in-baltimore.html; Timothy Williams & Mitch
Smith, Cleveland Officer Will Not Face Charges in Tamir Rice Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
28, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/29/us/tamir-rice-police-shootiing-cleveland.html.
76 Following the race riots of the 1960s, President Lyndon Baines Johnson appointed a
commission, chaired by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, to determine the causes of the riots. The
Commission Report concluded that the principle trigger derived from confrontations between
the local police and members of local black communities. It also found that residents held an
often justified perception of the largely white police as an occupying force which was in the
community to serve and protect the interests of the privileged white communities rather than
to serve and protect the legitimate interests of the local minority residents, and that the police
inherently harbored racist attitudes toward residents of minority communities that they were
also charged to serve. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, THE KERNER
REPORT (1967), http://faculty.washington.edu/qtaylor/documents_us/Kerner%20Report.htm;
James Meyerson, What Is the Kerner Commission and Why it Should Be Revisited in Light of
Ferguson, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG (Oct. 18, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
james-meyerson/what-is-the-kerner-commis_b_5686572.html.
77 Jelani Cobb, Crimes and Commissions, NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2014) [hereinafter KERNER
COMM’N REPORT] (quoting NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 1 (1968), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/Digitization/8073NCJRS.pdf),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/08/
crimes-commissions.
78 See sources cited supra notes 30, 70.
79 Id. (quoting KERNER COMM’N REPORT, supra note 77, at 1).
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communities feel that cops are not there to protect and serve, but to
occupy and degrade; the staggering consequences not only of
convictions but also of arrests, as measured in lost school days, lost
wages, and lost jobs. Lastly, the “now what”: approaches to reform, and
changes that each of the institutional actors—police, prosecutors, courts,
and defenders—must make to produce ameliorative changes motivated
by a concern for greater fairness, equality, and justice.
Windows left too long unfixed may well breed social disorder. A
broken theory of policing that encourages a false dichotomy between
occupation and disorder has produced its own form of social disorder. It
is well past time that it be repaired. 80

80 As this Introduction goes to press, the New York City Council has begun debate on a set
of eight bills labeled the Criminal Justice Reform Act, which would provide police officers the
discretion to process certain low-level Broken Windows offenses like drinking in public,
littering, riding bikes on sidewalks, and violations of park rules, in civil, rather than in criminal
court. Some advocates, including the New York Civil Liberties Union, have praised the
proposals for seeking to prevent poor, New Yorkers of color from accumulating arrests, arrest
records, and criminal warrants in connection with low level, quality of life offenses. Others have
raised concerns that the bills do too little by: failing to decriminalize all or some of the low-level
conduct at issue, leaving unchallenged the underlying assumption of Broken Windows policing,
vesting too much power in the NYPD, stripping those processed civilly of their right to counsel,
and allowing for the imposition of fines, the entry of civil judgments for a failure to pay,
thereby saddling those affected with the attendant consequence of garnishment of wages or
bank accounts, and an adverse credit rating that could have long term impact on the person’s
eligibility for bank loans, student loans, or mortgages. As one critic has written, “this package of
reforms is at best a baby step, and at worst, may open the door to more racially discriminatory
police actions. . . . If the City Council is serious about reducing the negative impacts of the
criminal justice system, it should start by revisiting its decision to expand the NYPD. More
police with more discretion is not the answer.” Alex S. Vitale, Opinion, Criminal Justice Reform
Act Is No Alternative to Broken Windows Policing, GOTHAM GAZETTE (Jan. 25, 2016), http://
www.gothamgazette.com/index.php/opinion/6112-criminal-justice-reform-act-is-noalternative-to-broken-windows-policing; see also Madison Margolin, Will NYC’s New Approach
to Policing Minor Offenses Be Any Different From ‘Broken Windows’?, VILLAGE VOICE (Jan. 25,
2016), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/will-nycs-new-approach-to-policing-minor-offensesbe-any-different-from-broken-windows-8193059; Emma Whitford, NYC’S Broken Windows
Reform Is Too Weak, Critics Say, GOTHAMIST (Jan. 26, 2016, 11:33 AM), http://gothamist.com/
2016/01/26/broken_windows_reform.php.

